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Abstract 
This paper studies the relationship between trade and institutions in regions for the period 1980 
to 2010 using the generalized method of moments estimation technique and other instrumental 
variable estimation technique such as two stage least square and two stage generalized least 
square in order to ensure validity of our  GMM estimates. The study finds that, consistent with 
past literature, institutions do have a significant effect on trade. Different measures that capture 
domestic and international institutions were used. It was found that domestic institutions had a 
more significant effect on trade than international institutions. Domestic institutions were also 
found to be more inward looking and protectionist in nature and were probably increasing 
average tariffs in order to protect domestic trade, while international institutions were probably 
more concerned about regional integration, tariff reduction and trade facilitation in general. 
Using different measures of economic policy, we find from our results that institutions that affect 
trade do not differ significantly from one another. The effectiveness of domestic institutions in 
promoting trade was examined through interacting domestic institutions with access to local and 
foreign markets (market access), market potential (market size) as well as regional average 
tariffs, the result was that domestic institutions increase cost of international trade through 
increasing tariffs but decrease transportation to markets and were not developing regional 
specific market potential, the results for international institutions were a reduction of all three 
factors i.e. tariffs, cost of transportation to market and market size. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Exports and institutions can have strong consequences for growth and development in regions. 
The study of how institutions affect international trade is likely to provide an insight, on how 
regional specific institutions affect export oriented growth. A number of studies have shown that 
institutions in many developing countries are weak, and as such have strong and negative 
consequences on growth and development in many of such countries. While the more developed 
countries of the World have better established and effective institutions. Therefore institutions 
can have a strong effect, on trade since it is likely to affect investor’s perception and 
subsequently the flow of international investment to countries. Few regional studies have 
undertaken the task of studying the impact of institutions on trade from a regional centric point 
of view. Studies by Mauro (1995) and Keefer and Knack (1995) argue that weak institutions are 
often responsible for slower growth. Others have posited that weak institutions are many a time 
responsible for lower factor productivity and lower per capita income see Hall and Jones (1999), 
Olson et al (2000), Acemoglu (2001) using instrumental variable estimation to account for the 
endogeneity.  
The debate on how exactly institutions can affect the overall economy of a country remains 
vague, since many studies have not till date arrived, at some specific channels through 
institutions impact growth. A host of variables have been found to be adversely affected by 
institutions, some include foreign direct investment (Wei, 2000), capital accumulation, total 
investment and other specific forms of public investments etc. Till date not many papers have 
thoroughly dealt with the dynamics between trade in commodities and institutions, Anderson 
(2001) observed the risk of predation due to contract default and states that imperfect 
enforcement of contract has a negative effect on foreign trade flow.  
However, other in-depth studies such as Dollar and Kraay (2002) find that institutional quality is 
highly correlated with trade, this made them to be primarily concerned with long term decadence 
growth, which they attributed to be affected by trade oriented growth and institutions. They also 
attributed rising income and falling poverty to perceived liberalization expansion in countries 
arguing that such expansion are in fact responsible for trade growth and economic growth on the 
long run. 
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After studying liberalization regimes Wacziarg and Welch (2003), find that trade growth is 
strongly related to economic growth and investment. Although the paper, by Rodrik et al, (2004), 
does not find a direct relation between trade and income, they find that there exist a complex 
relationship between institutions, trade and growth in a host of countries. They also argue that 
institutions have a direct effect on incomes, meaning that trade has an indirect effect on incomes 
through institutions.  
Institutions, on the other hand have the tendency to promote integration, while integration is 
likely to affect institutional quality in a positive manner. Other papers such as Freund and Bolaky 
(2004) have studied the dynamics of trade and growth and stress that labour and business 
regulation are also quite important. Chiang et al (2005), provide evidence from panel studies that 
a broad domestic mix of policy, institutions and infrastructure plays a significant role in 
moderating trade impact on growth in countries. Development agencies on the other hand have 
focused extensively on growth and trade facilitation processes, development assistance, regional 
integration and offered strong recommendation for sustained institutional development, thereby 
arguing that development is interlinked with the political economic reforms, institutional 
development, past colonial ties and history, development assistance as well as North-South trade 
relationship.  
The paper by Wilson et al (2004) capture the effects of trade facilitation using four major 
components of trade facilitation efforts namely, ports efficiency, customs, regulation, and e-
business (which was used as a proxy for telecommunication, financial intermediation and service 
sector impact on trade facilitation). They find that trade facility reforms gains are enormous, with 
a huge benefit accruing to exporting. Institutional quality is strongly linked with infrastructure 
quality, past papers e.g. Limao and Venables (2000) state that infrastructure has a strong link to 
transportation cost, they argue that transportation accounts for up to 40% of trade cost for coastal 
countries and about 60% of trade cost for landlocked countries. Livenchenko (2004) studies the 
differences in institutional quality and find that differences in institution quality were a source of 
comparative advantage and that institutional differences in countries had a strong effect on trade 
patterns. Therefore country specific infrastructural provisions are often a reflection of 
institutions. 
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The study by Bougheas et al (1999) investigated the impact of institutions on trade cost after 
endogenizing, transport cost and infrastructure formation using the DSF Ricardian trade model 
and find that there exist a positive relationship between infrastructure and trade volumes in 
countries that were found to be optimal to invest in infrastructure in using a host of European 
countries in their sample. Anderson and Marcoullier (2002), find that trading partner’s 
institutional quality had a positive effect on bilateral trade volumes. The paper by Ranjay and 
Lee (2003) study various aspects of institutional quality such as contract enforcements and their 
probable impact on trade volumes, after constructing a theoretical model to show trade volumes 
can be affected negatively through ineffectual contract enforcements, they find that ineffective 
enforcements of contracts does affect trade volumes for both differentiated goods and 
homogenous goods but that the effect were strong for differentiated goods than for homogenous 
goods.  
Finally, Depken and Sonara (2005) study intensively, the impact of economic freedom on US 
consumer exports and imports and find that institutional quality of partner countries has a 
positive effect on US exports to such countries. Since international trade is not likely to be 
homogenous, developed countries that exports finished goods will continue to have a strategic 
trade advantage over countries that export primary goods. This assertion is supported by 
Hirschman (1958) and Seers (1964) who argue that it will be more beneficial for a country to 
have more externalities coming from manufacturables, than from natural resource sectors in their 
economy. Araujo, Mion and Ornealas (2012) have investigated the factors that promote 
exporting as a measure of international trade from one country to another and found that weak 
institutions cannot simply be considered as extra sunk or fixed cost to exporting firms but they 
also affect firm trade volumes significantly 
 This paper investigates the relationship between trade and institutions using a sample of data 
from seven regions which include Sub Saharan Africa, European Union, North America, Latin 
America, Australia, Middle-East and North Africa and South East Asia Pacific. We use different 
measures of institutions obtained World Development Indicator (WDI) data. Two different set of 
institutional quality index were constructed for domestic and international measures of 
institutions, we created this index using principal component analysis which uses Eigen-values 
matrix to generate a variable from a set of closely related variables. 
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We identify a host of exogenous measures that are likely to affect trade, such as country specific 
market size  (GDP per capita), market access (access to both domestic and foreign markets) and 
average tariffs, access to capital, aggregate commercial bank lending, exchange rate and foreign 
direct investment. We also consider the extent of institutional effectiveness on market access and 
average tariffs using interactive variables to determine how effective institutions are in 
promoting trade, since past literature already posits that institutions have a strong positive effect 
on trade. We also account for regional specific effects that can affect trade as well as fluctuation 
in output productivity in years using regional dummies and year. We run four different model 
specifications using ordinary least square (OLS), two stage least square (2SLS), two stage 
generalized least square (2SGLS) and generalized method of moments (GMM), to estimate 
various variants of our trade-institution equations.  
Our results show that institutions is contributing to exports promotion in regions, however we 
had mixed results using the interaction variables which showed that institutions were in fact not 
as effective as it seemed in promoting trade particularly in the areas of  facilitating access to 
markets and in tariffs reduction. The rest of the paper is divided into four sections.  The first 
section focuses on stylized facts on trade and institutions, and problems with measuring 
institutions. The second section addresses the theory and methodology, data and sources. The 
third section of the paper centers on empirical analysis and results and finally the last section 
conclude the study. 
2.0 Regional Exporting and Institutional Quality  
Regions can benefit enormously from international trade, by strategically positioning themselves 
to exploit the advantages arising from international trade in commodities. Export oriented growth 
and trading in the global market has the capacity to alleviate poverty and support 
entrepreneurship in many developing countries while it has the tendency to drive growth and 
promote learning and transfer of technology in many cooperating developed economies.    
Institutions can also play a vital role in reducing the overall cost of trade in regions since 
reducing the cost of transportation to local and foreign markets can be a strong incentive for 
exporters.  There are many ways through which trade is likely to contribute to the overall growth 
and development of a country. Exports can for instance serve as a source of income to a country 
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thereby boosting the exporting countries GDP. While relations accruing from trade, can help in 
the facilitation of transfer of technology, from developed countries to developing countries. 
Output productivity varies differently with regions. Regional climatic differences often mean, 
agricultural products and jobs sectors are often different across regional divide. For instance the 
services sectors accounts for a greater percentage of labor market participation in developed 
countries in Europe and North-America while most developing countries in Africa and Latin 
America often depend more on agriculture.  
Exports from Latin America are mainly in basic food items, consumer goods and building 
materials see UN statistics 2010.  Trade in regions today is been facilitated by various regional 
trade alliances, the North American economy for instance is divided into three major blocks 
which include the North America Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the Caribbean Community 
and Common Market (CARICOM), the Central American Common Market (CACM). Canada 
and the United States already concluded one of the Worlds bilateral trade treaties that have the 
total elimination of tariffs in goods and services across their borders. With Mexico recent 
qualification for tariff free trade with the United States through the NAFTA agreement trade 
among the three major North America countries has increased by over 24% since 2010 see 
World Trade Organization (WTO) statistics 2011.  
In 2012 the European Union economy had a combined GDP of 16.07 trillion dollars, see OECD 
2012 data. Credit Suisse Global Wealth report 2012 also states that the EU has the highest net 
wealth in the World and currently consist of 33% of the total global net wealth. It currently 
consists of 28 countries with a single common market which makes up the European Economic 
Community consisting of three non member countries which are Norway, Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein (UNCTAD Statistics 2012). 
Australia also has the fifth highest per capita GDP and the twelfth largest economy in the world. 
Owing to a balance in exports of manufactured products and commodities, Australia is the only 
OECD country not to have experienced a recession during the 2008/2009 global economic 
prices. However Australian economy has persistently been affected particularly by the non 
mining sub-regions, whose economies have entered into recession despite the GDP growth of 
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3.5%. Most of Australia’s trade is with Japan and China with the United States and New Zealand 
a distant third and fourth.  
According to the World Bank statistics 2012, the African economy is endowed with natural 
resources and has the capability of feeding and sustaining its population. While Africa continues 
to export primary commodities, trade among African countries is often lacking. In 2005 Africa’s 
economy grew by 5%. However the sub-Saharan region of Africa, has been the least successful 
in poverty reduction, with more that 50% of the population, living below the poverty line see UN 
statistics 2012. UNESCO World review 2000, also state that nearly 52% of the children in sub-
Saharan Africa were enrolled in primary schools this was the lowest compared to other 
continents particularly Europe and Australia.  The obvious implication is that, with a 
considerable percentage of unskilled manpower, its exports are likely to be considerably in 
primary goods.  
Other regions such as Latin America and South East Asia, have are also heavily reliant on 
agriculture and mineral exports. Tourism has also thrived in the South East Asian, while 
countries like China and Japan export a considerable amount of manufactured goods (UNCTAD 
Statistics 2012).  
 
2.0 Some Stylized Facts on Regional Trade and Institutions 
International trade in goods has not returned to the rapid growth rate of the years preceding the 
crisis (see figure 1&2). On the contrary, it decelerated further in 2012, and while the outlook for 
world trade remains uncertain, the first signs in 2013 do not point to an expansion. After a sharp 
fall in 2008–2009 and a quick recovery in 2010, the volume of trade in goods grew by only 5.3 
per cent in 2011 and by 1.7 per cent in 2012. This slower rate of expansion occurred in 
developed, developing and transition economies alike, see table 1 (Trade and development 
Report, 2013).  
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Figure 1: Trade Structure by Regions (1960-2010)  
 
 
Sluggish economic activity in developed economies accounted for most of the slow down in 
international trade (See table 1). In 2012, european imports of goods shrank by almost 3 percent 
in volume and by 5 percent in value. Extremely weak intra-european trade was responsible for 
almost 90 percent of the decline in european exports in 2012. Likewise, Japan’s exports have not 
yet recovered from their sharp fall caused by the earthquake of 2011, while the volume of 
imports has continued to grow at a moderate pace. Also, among the developed economies, only 
the United states maintained a positive growth rates in its international trade, although this 
appears to be slowing down in 2013. Trade also decelerated considerably in developing and 
transition economies. Both exports and imports grew sluggishly in 2012 and the first months of 
2013 in most developing regions. The sole exception was Africa, where exports recovered in 
countries previously affected by civil conflict. Export growth declined to 4 per cent in the 
developing countries as a whole. This slowdown included Asian countries that had previously 
played a major role in boosting international trade. 
The crisis of 2008–2009 has altered trade patterns in both developed and developing countries. 
Imports by all developed regions remain below their pre-crisis level, and only the United States 
has managed to increase its exports to a higher level than their previous peak of August 2008 
(see figure 1). On the other hand, exports from the group of emerging market economies were 22 
per cent above their pre-crisis peaks, while the corresponding figure for their imports was 26 per 
cent higher (see figure 2&3). However, the pace of growth of trade of these economies has 
slowed down significantly: during the pre-crisis years, between 2002 and 2007, their export 
volume grew at an average annual rate of 11.3 per cent, but fell to only 3.5 per cent between 
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January 201 and April 2013. Growth in the volume of their imports also slowed down from 12.4 
per cent to 5.5 per cent over the same period (UNCTAD Report 2013). 
Figure 2: Trade Structre by Regions (1960-2010)  
 
 
Trade growth also decelerated considerably in developing and transition economies in 2012, 
though the figures remained positive for most countries. In the transition economies, the rate of 
growth of the volume of exports was 1 per cent in 2012, down from 4.2 per cent in 2011, and 
that of imports was 3.9 per cent in 2012, down from 15.7 per cent in 2011. Likewise, in 
developing countries the rate of growth of exports fell from 6 per cent in 2011 to 3.6 per cent in 
2011, and that of imports from 7.4 per cent in 2011 to 4.5 per cent in 2012. 
 
Figure 3: Regional Share in World Trade 1960-2010  
 
 
At the sub-regional level, two notable exceptions stand out from this general pattern of 
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from low levels in 2011, which contributed to higher trade growth in Africa as a whole. The 
second is the absolute decline in the volume of exports from South Asia, explained mainly by a 
reduction of oil exports from the Islamic Republic of Iran, though India’s export volumes also 
fell, by 2.5 per cent. This was largely due to the economic slowdown in Europe, which accounts 
for almost one fifth of India’s total exports, as well as weak exports to China. 
 
Figure 4: Regional Share in World Trade 1960-2010  
 
Inefficient institutions, in contrast, can lead to serious obstacles for trade. Bigsten et al. (2000), 
for instance, describe how the absence of an efficient legal system hinders interaction between 
manufacturing firms in a number of African countries and potential foreign importers (see table 
1). It is shown that contractual flexibility is pervasive and that it is a rational response to risk: the 
riskier the environment, the higher the incidence of contract non-performance, and the higher the 
probability of renegotiation of a contract.  Complete contract breaches and the use of lawyers and 
courts to enforce the original contract are rare, simply because of the absence of an efficient legal 
system.  Instead, suppliers and clients fulfill their contracts but in a "flexible" way: supplies 
occasionally arrive late or their quality is different from what was ordered, and clients sometimes 
pay late.  In their dealings with African firms, trading partners are often taken by surprise by 
contractual delays and calls for contractual renegotiation.  Those who are used to functioning in a 
very different environment may find it hard to understand that the somewhat unpredictable 
behaviour of African firms in such cases is a rational response to an inefficient system (Marion 
and Norda, 2004).  This may explain why foreign firms find it difficult to deal with African 
partners and why African manufacturers have a hard time breaking into export markets. 
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Table 1: Trend of trade, institutions and economic growth 
  Share in world 
non-oil export 
Per capita income GDP growth 
rates 
Share in world 
population 
Strength of legal 
right 
No. Of days to 
execute contract 
No. of major 
countries 
Region/year 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 
 
 
Australia 0.32 0.27 33379 38837 2.00 1.91 0.31 0.32 9 9 395 395 1 
Africa 0.67 0.87 965 1257 3.44 4.85 13.23 14.81 4.6 4.65 625 651 61 
Asia 24.14 35.41 1499 2577 6.76 8.70 57.05 56.97 4.7 6.1 476 493 51 
Europe 39.91 38.51 25929 28669 3.92 2.13 7.89 7.28 6.7 7.0 568 549 27 
Latin America 4.15 3.53 4804 5843 4.48 6.02 7.58 7.59 3.9 5.4 710 711 26 
Middle east 1.30 2.50 3899 4998 5.39 6.33 6.02 6.47 3.4 3.5 661 670 17 
North America 20.54 12.71 31198 32916 4.41 2.61 6.81 7.00 8 8 435 435 3 
Source: Authors’ compilation   
 
Inefficient institutions represent a cost factor for domestic exporters and thus lower their 
international competitiveness with negative repercussions on export flows; transaction costs due 
to inefficient institutions also raise the final consumer price of imported goods with negative 
repercussions on a country’s import flows. Evidences from empirical and theoretical literature 
suggest that lower institutional quality has a substantially negative effect on trade (Anderson and 
Marcouiller 2002); likewise, De Groot et al. (2004) discovered that better quality of formal 
institutions tends to coincide with more trade and that similarity between trading partners in the 
quality of their institutions promotes trade. 
  
3.0 Theory and Methodology 
A simple theory that analyses the effect of exporters’ perception in regions (a reflection of 
institutions) on regional exports is presented in this section. While there are several theories 
however to choose from we stick by the theory presented by Francois and Manchin (2012) which 
examines the effect of different factors trade flows. We do not use the gravity model since our 
focus is trade in regions; we as well adopted a partial log model specification. Francois and 
Manchin (2007) examined bilateral trade flows particularly for cases of zero bilateral trade using 
a sample selection gravity trade model specification. This involved specifying a sample selection 
model that takes into account the censoring process that leads to zero bilateral trade flows. Other 
similar papers such as Fabelmayr and Kohler (2004), also estimated bilateral trade flows and 
trade volumes using Tobit estimator to examine bilateral zeros. Araujo, Mion and Ornelas (2012) 
after describing how institutional environment both domestic and international affect home 
exports, develop a two empirical strategy model, in one specification they used firm year fixed 
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effects to control for time varying firm specific characteristics, while in the other they model 
selection using two step Heckman procedure using the augmented gravity model variables as 
exclusion restrictions obtaining the same predictions using both methods. 
Using the model first presented by Araujo and Ornelas (2007), the methodology we employ is 
one, in which the institutional environment will affect exporting in regions, having implication 
for the private sector of an economy which we extend to include other factors that affect trade.  
This can happen for two reasons; first there will be a direct effect of institutions on exporting 
such that local producers or exporters will receive back their invested revenue in trade, this will 
make local producer export more. Secondly, due to gains accruing from exports as result of good 
institutions new producers are likely to want to take to exporting and establish trade partnerships. 
The model will therefore depict one in which export volume will vary either positively or 
negatively, with trading partnership this will be particularly true since the nature of partnership 
will depend on institutions. If a trade contract then implies a contract where k > 0, where k is 
profits in this case, we can evaluate some probable scenarios and make prepositions based on 
these. Firstly, how exporters and distributors partnership relationships begin and terminate, 
secondly, how at equilibrium such partnership are likely to be formed, thirdly how profit 
maximization goals of distributors and importers can sustain partnership and finally how 
exporters positive gains will maintain trade relationships. Detailed explanation of the 
prepositions concerning the trade partnerships are contained in appendix I  
3.1 Model Specification 
3.1.1 Trade Equation Estimated Using OLS  
The OLS variant of the trade equation is one in which regional trade (exports in constant US 
dollars) depends on institution and a set of vectors of exogenous variables    which affect trade, 
this include region specific market size (GDP per capita), tariffs (exports duties and import 
duties), market access (cost of transportation to both local and foreign markets), exchange rate, 
commercial bank lending, foreign direct investment and regional specific economic policy. It 
also includes regional specific trends in exporting and the squared and cube of average tariffs 
and exchange rate as expressed in equation 7 where   is the index for regions and   is the index 
for time. 
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We control for fixed effect by including the fixed effect dummy, this controls for regional 
specific technological endowments that are likely to affect exporting and the time dummy ‘year’ 
is to control for time trend, this allows us to control for regional specific time varying 
productivity differences in years. In other instance where included, the squared and cube of 
exchange rate and average tariffs as controls was used to test for the robustness of the regression 
estimates. 
3.1.2 Trade Equation using Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
We also present the two stage least squares simultaneous equation model variant of the trade 
equation in equations 8 and 9. The trade equation is a linear specification where   is the index for 
regions and   is the index for time. We conduct instrumental correction for institutions in 
equation 8 due to the assumption that institution is endogenous. 
                                                                      
                                                                       
Here once again in equation 9, exports, our measure of trade depends on institutions and the 
vector of exogenous variables      that affect trade. This include regional market size (GDP per 
capita), tariffs (exports and import duties), market size (GDP per capita), market access (cost of 
transportation to both local and foreign markets), exchange rate, commercial bank lending, 
foreign direct investment and regional specific economic policy. 
In this variant of the trade model, we control for endogeneity of the institution variable by 
conducting instrumental correction of institutions in the first stage of the model (see equation 8) 
and using this correction in the second stage of the model (see equation 9). In this section we 
establish why we believe that our exclusion restriction will hold, since they are typically 
theoretical, the restriction we impose on our trade equation is that our instrument (    ) the 
logarithm of population should be highly correlated with institutions in equation 8 but not with 
trade (Exports) in equation 9, as shown in equation 10. That is, the correlation between the error 
term and the instrument should be identically equal to zero. Therefore instruments           is 
not correlated with the disturbances (    and     ) and if the exogenous component of institutions 
is not correlated with the disturbances we can identify the variation in the dependent variable 
exports as the slope of the institution coefficient 
E|              |=0                                                                     10  
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This shows that there is sufficient variation between the instrument and institutions which is non-
zero as shown in equation 11. 
Cov (                    ) ≠ 0               11 
In other words the exclusion restriction is such that the logarithm of population will have strong 
effect on institutions in the first stage of regression but not on trade in the second stage. This is 
justified by the fact that institutions will actually use population growth projection (Logarithm 
Population) for planning purposes, allowing logarithm of population to have a strong effect on 
institutions but not with exports.  
 
3.1.3 Trade Equation using 2SGLS with the Interactive Variable 
In this section we present a different variant of our trade model. Here we use the 2SGLS random 
effect model. We include an interactive variable “interact” in each case in the model. The vectors 
of exogenous variables remain the same as the variables for the 2SLS. We also conduct the 
instrumental correction for institutions using the same instrument      (logarithm of population) in 
the first stage in equation in equation 12. The predictive values of institutions are now used in the 
second stage of the equation. 
 
                                                                              
                                                            
The use of interactive variable allows us to determine the effectiveness of institutions in 
promoting trade by interacting institutions with market size, market access and average tariffs. 
Market size is likely to affect trade in a significant manner if market potential plays a significant 
role in attracting trade to regions by attracting potential investors while the presence of good 
institutions can also reduce the transaction cost of trade such as tariffs and cost to destination 
markets significantly.  
 
3.1.4 Trade Equation Using GMM 
The difference and system generalized method of moment (GMM) provide a useful way of 
overcoming the issues of endogeneity. They are also particularly suitable for studying long-run 
dynamics. The GMM estimator allows us to handle modeling concerns such as fixed effects that 
are likely to affect exporting and the presence of endogenous regressors; thus allowing us to 
15 
 
resolve the issues of endogeneity of the institutional variable while avoiding panel bias. It also 
handles unbalanced panel and multiple endogenous regressors (Arellano, Bond 1998; Doornik, 
Arellano, Bond 2002; and Roodman 2009). Both the system and difference GMM fit the one 
dependent variable               , model using linear GMM as shown below in equation 14, 
where i represent indexes for regions, and t is the index for time. The vector of explanatory 
variables is given by       and       is the lagged value of the dependent variable. The 
disturbance term      has two orthogonal components the fixed effects     and the idiosyncratic 
shocks       .  
                                      
 
                                       
The system GMM augments the difference GMM by estimating simultaneously in differences 
and levels, the two equations been distinctly instrumented. The GMM has some obvious 
advantages such as, it is not restricted by choice of functional form and it overcomes issues of 
endogeneity by using all explanatory variables as instruments and the estimates are robust even 
in the presence of heteroscedatic errors. 
3.2  Data Sources and Measurements 
A panel of seven regions was used for a period of 1980 to 2010, representing 31 years. All data 
are obtained from World development indicator (WDI) database and others sources, unless 
otherwise stated.   
Dependent Variables  
Our dependent is exports in constant US dollars. We take the log of exports due to the noisy 
nature of exports. Exports are a measure of total exports of goods and services from countries in 
regions.  
Explanatory Variables 
Other explanatory variables include the various measures institutions, these include 
infrastructural measures (number of telephone lines), judicial measures (strength of legal rights) 
and civil administrative measures (time to execute contract in no of days) these were used as 
measures for domestic institutions, also two measures for international institutions were also 
used these were multilateral official development assistance (ODA) that captures aid agencies 
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specific aid disbursement policy particularly to trade and other economic policy conditionality, 
and the dummy for signatory of world trade organization membership, which measure the 
influence of the world trade organization on regional specific trade institutions. These measures 
were also used to construct an index for both domestic and international institutions respectively 
using principal component analysis. An index for economic policy was constructed using 
principal component analysis and regression component approach; respectively see Burnside and 
dollar (2001) Abeyasekera (2004) and Schlens (2009), for further discussions on index 
construction. Exchange rate was used to capture fluctuations in the global economy that are 
likely to affect trade; this is the average local currency to dollar exchange rate in countries, while 
market size was measured using GDP per capita. Access to credit facilities was measured using 
regional specific aggregate commercial bank lending in constant US dollars and transaction cost 
of trade  is the cost of transportation of goods and services to both local and foreign markets 
(captured using crude oil price) multiplied by regional size in square kilometers. We present the 
table data in table 1 in the appendix. 
4.0 Empirical Analysis and Results 
4.1 Do Institutions Promote Trade? 
In this part of the paper we try to answer if indeed institutions affect trade. The intuition for this 
study is one that tries to portray a situation where institution provides the adequate enabling 
environment for trade. Exporters or producers are likely to develop strong ties with distributors 
and buyers in importing countries due to good enabling environment. This is likely to lead to an 
increase in exporting making institutions to have the potentials of promoting trade.  
We find no reason to dispute this fundamental intuition since countries that have poor institutions 
are likely to have very few trade ties internationally. The only way therefore,  institutions is 
likely to be related to trade is through strong ties based on trust and guarantees of quick and fair 
redress in case of disputes between exporters and buyers. 
The role of institutions therefore will be one that helps in the trade facilitation process. We 
present four different variants of the reduced form trade equation model. In the first variant using 
OLS, trade depends on institutions and host of endogenous variables that we identify to affect 
trade. In the second variant, we present a set of simultaneous equations since we estimates the 
two stage least squares model on the premise of the presence of endogenous regressors in this 
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case we assume that institution is indigenous therefore it is likely that the OLS estimates are 
likely to be biased. The third variant of our trade equation is estimated using the Arellano-Bond 
GMM and System GMM dynamic panel method. This also allows us to control for the presence 
of endogenous regressors in our model specification and long run effects that affect trade. 
4.1.2  Results- Using ordinary least square 
The results using OLS is presented in tables 2 to 6 for our measures of domestic and 
international institutions using the RCA (regression component approach) and PCA (principal 
component approach) indexes for policy. The results in table 2 and 3 are almost similar; it shows 
that the measure of infrastructure for institution was not having any significant effect on 
exporting. Legal rights and contract length had a negative and positive significant effect 
respectively on exporting in regions. Average tariffs had a negative effect on exports while 
market size had a positive effect on exports. The index constructed from the three measure of 
domestic institutions show that domestic institution was affecting trade in exports negatively in 
regions. The results for the measures of international institutions are presented in table 4 and 5. 
The dummy for World Trade Organization had no significant effect on trade; however the 
influence exerted by international multilateral organizations was positively contributing to 
exports in a significant manner. Economic policy had a positive effect on trade using the 
different indexes while; market access which is the cost to local and international markets had a 
significant effect on exporting. The squared and cube of average tariffs and market size where 
included as variables in the model to test for robustness of the OLS estimates the results were 
found to remain the same. 
 
4.1.2 Results- Using two stage least square 
Our model is exactly identified since we use only one instrument Logarithm of population 
(          ) for institutions. Testing for over-identifying restrictions was however not necessary 
since our model is exactly identified. In the model    represents time invariant unobserved effects 
on trade and     represents time varying unobserved effects on trade. The test for endogeneity of 
the institution variable was conducted; the Hausman-Wu test rejected the null hypothesis with a 
p-value of 0.01. Therefore using institution as an independent variable could lead to bias results. 
We used fixed effect method of estimation because it allows us to control for unobservable 
heterogeneity and omitted variable bias in our model specification. 
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The results of the two stage least square estimates are presented below in table 6. The instrument 
logarithm of population performs well in general. It had a strong significant effect on institutions. 
Our argument is that the logarithm of population has no direct effect on exports. To prove this 
we put the logarithm of population into the OLS model and found that it had not significant 
effect on exports as discussed earlier. The second stage results are displayed below. The 2SLS 
estimation method differed from those of the OLS estimates, Domestic institutions was found to 
be contributing to exporting by 49 percentage points as opposed to the negative effect obtained 
from the OLS estimates, while international institutions were affecting exporting in a negative 
manner by 17 percentage points (see Column 5 and 6 of Table 6). These results show the 
importance of controlling for the endogeneity of institutions using 2SLS. Market size had no 
significant effect on exporting while market access and tariffs had a positive effect on exporting 
in regions. The implication of these findings is that cost of transportation to local and foreign 
markets was contributing in a positive manner to doing across regions while tariffs were 
favorable to trade. 
4.1.3 Results- Using two stage generalized least square (2GLS) 
The results using the interactive variables are presented in tables 7 and 8. The results shows that 
domestic institution were ineffective in promoting market size effectiveness in increasing exports 
in regions, was probably increasing cost of transportation to markets and not reducing tariffs on 
trade in general, since the interactive effect of institutions on market size which depicts market 
potential moved from having a positive significant effect to a negative significant effect on 
exporting in regions (see column 1 table 8, here market size was contributing 5 percentage point 
to exporting while the interactive variable (domestic institutions*market size) was reducing 
exporting by 5 percentage points). Domestic institutions were also probably not helpful in 
reducing tariffs since our results shows that the interactive effect domestic institutions*tariffs 
was reducing exports by 17 percentage points (see table 8 column 3 where tariffs contribution to 
trade moved from 6 to -11 percent) , this was also the same for market access. 
 International institutions were more effective in promoting markets contribution to trade since 
the interactive variable (international institutions*market size) had an increased positive 
significant effect on exports by 10 percentage points (from 5 to 15 percentage points see table 8 
column 2). International institutions were also more effective, in reducing tariffs and promoting 
exporting in regions, the interactive variable (international institutions*tariffs) increased 
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exporting by 44 percentage points (see table 8 column 4), this was also true for cost of 
transportation to destination market. 
4.1.4  Results- using generalized method of moments (GMM)  
The Arellano-Bond mis-specification test for auto-correlation was run and the a null hypothesis  
indicating the absence of auto correlated errors in the underlying levels variables in the 
regression estimates was accepted, see Arellano-Bond (1991) for further discussion on auto 
correlated errors in underlying levels variables of regression estimates. We also test the over-
identification restriction since the system GMM uses all explanatory variables and the lagged 
values of the explanatory variables as instruments, implying that we have more instruments than 
explanatory variables, and accept the null hypothesis that the regression residuals are not 
correlated with the set of exogenous variables allowing us to state that the instruments are strictly 
exogenous see Sargan (1958), Hansen (1982) and Bowsher (2002) for further discussion. We 
present the test results in Table 8.We also present the results of the exports regressions below in 
Table 9 for the model using system GMM. The results show that our measures of domestic 
institution (legal right strength and phone lines) are weakly significant in promoting exporting in 
regions. The index for domestic institution also has a weak significant effect on exporting. The 
dummy for WTO membership had a weak significant effect on exports while the flow of 
multilateral aid had no significant effect on exporting. The index for international institutions had 
a weak significant effect on exporting in regions. The implication of our results using this model 
is that institutions were in general having a significant effect on exporting in regions although 
this effect was weak. 
 
4.2 Summary of results 
1. Institutions were actually significant in promoting export in regions. However the results 
from the OLS, 2SLS and GMM estimation methods were mixed. The assumption that the 
institutional variable was endogenous actually led us to doubt the OLS estimates that 
domestic institutions were probably reducing exporting from regions even though the 
result was significant. 
2. The assumption that domestic institution was probably promoting exporting than 
international institutions were likely true since the results of our 2SLS estimates point out 
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that domestic institution was contributing to exporting while international institutions 
were reducing exporting in regions. 
3. Market size of importing and exporting did not affect regional exports significantly 
4. Transaction cost had a significant effect on exports from regions the results are mixed. 
The 2SLS results show that market size has a positive significant effect on exports while 
the GMM estimates show weak and negative significant effect on exports. 
5. Domestic institutions were reducing the effect of market size on trade (see table 8 column 
1) while international institutions were increasing the effect of market size on trade (see 
table 8 column 2). Therefore institutions were having an effect on the development of 
markets in both exporting and importing countries in regions. 
6. Domestic institutions were increasing the negative effect of transaction cost through 
increase in tariffs on trade; it is likely that domestic institutions were probably more 
welfare like in nature and firms particularly in the private sector is profit maximizing in 
nature. International institutions were actually making tariffs have a positive effect on 
exports by tariff reduction. 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
This paper studies the effect of institutions on trade; it also tries to answer if institutions are 
effective in developing market potential and reducing trade tariffs in regions. It was found that 
institutions were probably significantly affecting exports in regions even though our different 
results show mix findings.  
The results after accounting for endogeneity of the institution variable show that institutions 
were promoting exporting however the extent of the effects of institutions in promoting exports 
were mixed. The results of Institutional quality effectiveness (i.e. the interactive variable) in 
promoting exports were also mixed. It was found that although international institutions was 
probably improving market size through developing regional market potential, domestic 
institutions were not, also domestic institutions were also increasing the negative effect of tariffs 
on exporting in regions, while international institutions was promoting regional integration 
through tariffs reduction. 
The implication of our findings are that institutions in general matters in export promotion across 
regions, but that international institutions are probably more successful in promoting bilateral 
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trade across regions than domestic institutions. Domestic institutions are also more 
protectionists, in nature, therefore issues of decrease in tariffs are often of less concern to 
domestic institutions unlike international agencies.  
This paper also contributes to the body of knowledge through offering an insight on the 
difference of domestic institution effect on trade from those of international institutions thereby 
examining if there are differences in their contribution to regional trade promotion to which this 
paper concludes exists. 
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Appendix i 
Preposition I.  
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We assume that exporting partnership will breakdown when trade partnership frizzles out, 
therefore at the end of each period 1-n ϵ (0, 1), this implies that partnership will cease due to 
exogenous reasons where n depicts exogenous factors that affect trade. 
Preposition II. 
Every exporter at equilibrium will form a partnership whenever they meet a buyer or distributor, 
therefore an exporter will only terminate any existing relationship only when a buyer defaults, 
but will continue the relationship if the buyer or distributor complies with terms of business 
subject enforcement. According to Araujo and Ornelas (2007), the exporter posterior beliefs will 
be a function of their a-priori belief and the distributor default tendencies.  
    
    
          
 
 
                                                                                                               
Where    is posterior belief that producers or exporters are short sighted,    represents apriori 
belief of producers and exporters and   captures the distributors default rate. 
Preposition III. 
Since producers or exporters pay the cost of production distributors or buyers gain are always 
positive in nature, reducing the likelihood to default among distributors and buyers.  
Preposition IV. 
The producer or exporter will decide to terminate or not to terminate as long as his gain is 
positive which will depend on production cost, cost of transportation, demand for his products in 
importing countries, exchange rate fluctuations, importing country tariffs on foreign goods, 
access to capital to meet production demand etc. 
 
If the producers are short sighted seeing no gains from exporting we can write initial exports as a 
change in exporting with respect to the short sighted distributors and buyer belief where R is  
revenue. 
   
  
 
         
   
  
         
                    
                                                   
The direct effect of a change in exports with respect to producers belief will be obtained by 
taking the first order conditions of equation 1 and setting, 
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Since producer belief    is shaped by distributor’s ability to default without incurring cost (1- λ) 
export growth will be a factor of    = Export volume at the (k+1)
th 
period of partnership 
therefore the optimal export quantity will increase as the short sighted distributor or buyer belief 
decreases we can express this below as 
   
   
    
              
                    
                                                                               
Therefore the ongoing partnership without default causes a situation where the volume of trade 
increases overtime which can be expressed as shown in equation 5. 
   
  
   
   
   
   
   
  
                                                                                                            
We now extend this model by inserting other factors that affect trade therefore exports is a 
function of, f (  ,  ,   and   ), change in environment   , and these other factors that we 
identify affect trade, these include market size  , tariffs    and other exogenous variables   . 
that affects trade allowing us to rewrite equation 5, in equation 6, by extending the model.  
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Based on the model 6 above, the empirical outcome of this study would help in ascertaining the 
under-listed hypothesis. The hypothesis to be verified include (1) Institutions can either promote 
or reduce exporting in countries depending on institutional quality in both exporting and 
importing countries, (2) Domestic institutions are likely to affect exporting in a different manner 
from international institutions in countries since domestic institutions is likely to have a more far 
reaching effect on trade than international institutions, (3) Market size of importing and 
exporting countries is likely to affect exporting since this can have strong implications for cost of 
inputs for production as well as market demand for exporter’s goods in importing countries, (5) 
Transaction cost will have a negative effect on the final cost of exports and thus have a negative 
significant effect on exporting, (5) Institutions can either improve or reduce the impact of market 
size on exporting, since institutional quality is likely to affect the development of markets in both 
exporting and importing countries, And (6) Institutions can either increase or reduce the negative 
effect of transaction cost on trade depending on the quality of institutions in the exporting and 
importing countries. 
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Appendix ii 
 
Table 2 Impact of Domestic Institutions on Exporting Using RCA Measures of Policy  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Lnexports Lnexports lnexports lnexports 
     
Phone lines 0.01    
 (0.01)    
legal rights  -0.45***   
  (0.04)   
Contract length   0.01***  
   (0.001)  
Domestic Institution    -0.48*** 
    (0.06) 
Average tariffs -0.13*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.17*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Exchange rate -0.01** 0.001 -0.01** -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Lending rate  -0.01 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
FDI -5.33*** -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.21*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.01) (0.001) 
Market access 0.32*** 0.41*** 0.21*** 0.33*** 
 (0.94) (0.76) (0.78) (0.81) 
GDP per capita -0.03*** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Policy index (RCA) 0.81*** 0.72*** 0.93*** 0.85*** 
 (0.0959) (0.0776) (0.0798) (0.0831) 
Fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 210 210 210 210 
R-squared 0.738 0.830 0.823 0.804 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix iii 
Table 3 Impact of Domestic Institutions on Exporting Using PCA Measures of Policy  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Lnexports lnexports Lnexports lnexports 
     
Phone lines -0.004    
 (0.01)    
Legal rights  -0.48***   
  (0.04)   
Contract length    0.01***  
   (0.001)  
Domestic institution     -0.48*** 
    (0.06) 
Average tariff -0.15*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** 
 (0.0190) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Exchange rate -0.01** 0.0003 -0.01* -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Bank lending 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
FDI -0.60*** -0.60*** -0.60*** -0.60*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Market access 0.47*** 0.55*** 0.36*** 0.47*** 
 (10.4) (0.82) (0.93) (0.89) 
GDP per capita -0.04*** -0.01 -0.03*** -0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Policy index (PCA) 0.49*** 0.45*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
Year effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 210 210 210 210 
R-squared 0.72 0.82 0.79 0.79 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix iv 
Table 4 Impact of International Institutions on Exporting Using RCA Measures of Policy  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Lnexports Lnexports lnexports 
    
WTO dummy -0.05   
 (0.19)   
Multilateral Aid  -0.0001***  
  (0.28)  
International institution   -0.326*** 
   (0.09) 
Average tariff -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.15*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Exchange rate  -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Bank lending -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
FDI -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Market access 0.33*** 0.43*** 0.37*** 
 (0.94) (0.92) (0.92) 
GDP per capita -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Policy Index (RCA) 0.81*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
Fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes  
Year effect Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 210 210 210 
R-squared 0.73 0.76 0.75 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix V 
Table 5 Impact of International Institutions on Exporting Using PCA Measures of Policy  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Lnexports Lnexports lnexports 
    
WTO dummy -0.08   
 (0.20)   
Multilateral aid  -0.0001***  
  (2.93)  
International institution   -0.31*** 
   (0.10) 
Average tariff -0.14*** -0.17*** -0.16*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Exchange rate -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Bank lending 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
FDI -0.68*** -0.57*** -0.58*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
Market Access 0.60*** 0.56*** 0.57*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP per capita -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Policy Index (PCA) 0.48*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes  
Year effect Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 210 210 210 
R-squared 0.721 0.742 0.734 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix vi 
Table 6 Impact of Domestic Institutions on Exporting  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES lnexports Lnexports lnexports lnexports lnexports lnexports 
       
Phone lines 0.01      
 (0.01)      
Legal rights  0.73 0.73    
  (0.74) (0.55)    
Contract length    -0.01   
    (0.01)   
Domestic institutions     0.49**  
     (0.21)  
International institutions      -0.17** 
      (0.08) 
Average tariff 0.03*** 0.02 0.02 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.0120) (0.01) 
Exchange rate 0.001 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0004 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Bank lending -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
FDI 0.01 0.01 0.01** 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Market access 0.14*** 0.01 0.01 0.16*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 
 (0.10) 0.10) (0.72) (0.57) (0.01) (0.01) 
Market Size 0.004* 0.01** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.002 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.01) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Year effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 
R-squared 0.94 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.92 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix vii 
Table 7 Impact of Interactive Measures on Exporting  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Lnexports lnexports Lnexports 
    
Average tariff -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Exchange rate 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Bank lending 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FDI 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Market access -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.29*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Market size 0.14*** 0.24*** -0.40*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Phone lines*market size -0.004***   
 (0.0002)   
Legal rights*market size  -0.03***  
  (0.001)  
Contract length*market size   0.001*** 
   (0.33) 
Policy index 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Year effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 210 210 210 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix viii 
Table 8 Impact of Interactive Measures on Exporting  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Lnexports lnexports lnexports Lnexports 
     
Average tariffs -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Exchange  rate  0.001 0.001 0.0004 0.0004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Bank lending  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FDI 0.43 0.43 -0.53*** -0.53*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Market access -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.21*** -0.21*** 
 (0.73) (0.73) (0.73) (0.73) 
Market size 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01) 
Domestic Inst.*Market size -0.05***    
 (0.002)    
International inst*Market size  0.16***   
  (0.01)   
Domestic Inst.*average tariff   -0.11***  
   (0.01)  
International inst*average tariff    0.39*** 
    (0.03) 
Policy index 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.61*** 0.61*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) 
Year effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 210 210 210 210 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) 
VARIABLES lnexports lnexports lnexports lnexports lnexports lnexports 
       
Average tariffs -0.0639*** -0.0639*** -0.0522*** -0.0522*** -0.144*** -0.144*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0222) (0.0222) 
Exchange rate 0.00110 0.00110 0.000356 0.000356 -0.00744** -0.007** 
 (0.00182) (0.00182) (0.00287) (0.00287) (0.00373) (0.00373) 
Bank lending -0 -0 -0 -0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
FDI 0 0 -5.25e-11*** -5.25e-11*** -5.86e-11*** -5.86e-
11*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Market access -2.92e-10*** -2.92e-10*** -2.10e-10*** -2.10e-10*** -1.75e-10 -1.75e-10 
 (0) (0) (7.27e-11) (7.27e-11) (1.34e-10) (1.34e-10) 
Market size 0.0454*** 0.0454*** 0.0596*** 0.0596*** 0.0183** 0.0183** 
 (0.00349) (0.00349) (0.00654) (0.00654) (0.00782) (0.00782) 
Policy 0.516*** 0.516*** 0.610*** 0.610*** 0.712*** 0.712*** 
 (0.0538) (0.0538) (0.0828) (0.0828) (0.110) (0.110) 
D. institutions*mar s -0.0458***      
 (0.00186)      
Int. Institutions*ma s  0.160***     
  (0.00651)     
D.institutions*ave.   -0.111***    
   (0.00956)    
Int. Institutions *ave    0.389***   
    (0.0334)   
D.institutis*mar ac     -4.80e-10**  
     (2.38e-10)  
Int. Institons*ma ac      1.68e-09** 
      (8.30e-10) 
Year effect Yes Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix ix 
Table 9 System GMM Results of the Impact of Institutions on Trade Using  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES lnexports Lnexports Lnexports lnexports lnexports lnexports 
       
Legal right strength 2.23*      
 (1.33)      
Phone lines   0.92*     
  (0.48)     
Domestic institutions   4.21*    
   (2.50)    
WTO dummy    11.45*   
    (6.78)   
Multilateral Aid     0.0002  
     (0.0001)  
International institutions      1.75* 
      (1.04) 
Exchange rate 0.01 0.01* 0.01 0.09* 0.02 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) 
FDI 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Market Access -0.31 0.33** -0.23 -0.03* -0.04 -0.95* 
 (0.37) (0.14) (0.36) (0.16) (0.37) (0.56) 
Market size 0.33 -0.01* 0.35 1.54* 0.40* 0.71** 
 (0.22) (0.01) (0.22) (0.79) (0.22) (0.34) 
A-B (ar2) test (p- value) 0.65 0.24 0.62 0.73 0.49 0.83 
Sargan Test (p-value) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
